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In this chapter, we deal with a class of two-player, recursive games. Recall
that a recursive game is a stochastic game such that r(z, a, b) = 0 whenever
z is not an absorbing state. The games we consider have in addition the
following properties:
F.1 in any absorbing state, the payoﬀ to player 2 is positive;
F.2 for every initial state, and proÞle (α,β) where β is fully mixed (i.e.
βz(b) > 0 for every (z, b) ∈ S × B), the induced play reaches an ab-
sorbing state in Þnite time.
We present the proof of the following result.
Theorem 1 Any such game has a uniform equilibrium payoﬀ.
The interest of this speciÞc class of games lies in the fact that the problem
of equilibrium payoﬀ existence for general two-player games can be reduced
to this class. This reduction was done in the previous chapter. One saw
there that one could assume in addition absorbing payoﬀs of player 1 to be
negative. It is not clear how to use this additional property.
Let Γ be such a recursive game. The basic idea of the proof is to construct
a family (Γε)ε>0 of approximating games, in which player 2s strategy choice
is restricted. For each game in the family, we deÞne a modiÞed best-reply
map, and apply a Þxed-point argument to derive a stationary proÞle (αε, βε).
Moreover, (αε, βε) is a Puiseux proÞle (as a function of ε). The upshot is
to prove that limε γ(α
ε, βε) is a uniform equilibrium payoﬀ of Γ. We use
extensively the tools introduced in a previous chapter by Solan [6].
The chapter is organized as follows. We start with an example that shows
that a stationary ε-equilibrium needs not exist for such games. This contrasts
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with the case of zero-sum recursive games, where stationary ε-optimal strate-
gies do exist (Everett [2]). In Section 2, we deÞne the constrained games,
and the modiÞed best-reply map. The discussion there is complete, and is
a simpliÞcation of the proof in Vieille [8]1. By contrast, Section 3 contains
essentially no complete proof. Our goal there is to give a detailed (though
non-rigourous) discussion of a speciÞc case of a game with two non-absorbing
states. This discussion contains already all the features of the general proof,
but the simplicity of the setup enables us to avoid many technicalities.
1 Example
Consider the game
z1 . −2, 1
∗
z2
%
4
5 & +
1
5(−3, 3)
∗
z3 - −1, 2
∗
It is a variation on a example due to Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze [3].
There are three non-absorbing states z1, z2, z3. The game is a game of perfect
information : in each state, only one player has to play. In states z1and z3
player 2 can either choose to go to z2 (by playing the left column), or to go
to an absorbing state (right column) with the indicated payoﬀ. In state z2,
player 1 can either choose to go to z2 (by playing the top row), or to play the
bottom row, which results in a non-deterministic transition: with probability
4
5 , the play moves to z3; it otherwise moves to an absorbing state with payoﬀ
vector (−3, 3). Payoﬀ in the non-absorbing states is zero.
It is clear that this game has the payoﬀ and transition features we assume
in this lecture. For ε small enough, there is no proÞle (α,β) that is an ε-
equilibrium for any initial state. Indeed, if αz2 puts a positive probability
on the bottom row, the unique (ε−)best reply of player 2 is the stationary
strategy which chooses the left column in both states z1 and z3. The unique
(ε−)best reply of player 1 to this strategy is the stationary strategy which
chooses the top row in state z2.
If αz2puts probability one on the top row, any (ε−)best reply of player 2
when the initial state is z3 chooses the right column in state z3. Given any
such strategy, the unique (ε−)best reply of player 1 when the initial state is
z2 is the stationary strategy which chooses the bottom row in state z2.
1I wish to thank Eilon Solan for very helpful suggestions.
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This prompts the following question. Given z, is there a stationary ε-
equilibrium for the initial state z ? This is the case in the example above.
Whether this holds or not in general is an open problem.
2 Constrained games
We denote by Σs, Ts the sets of stationary strategies of the two players, and
set
Ts(ε) = {β ∈ Ts such that βz(b) ≥ ε for every z ∈ S
∗, b ∈ B}
Choose integers n0, ..., n|B|×|S∗| such that n0 = 0, and np+ 1 > |S|(np + 1),
for each p, and set N = n|B|×|S∗| For each ε, we deÞne a set-valued map on the
convex compact set Σs× Ts(ε
N). Equivalently, we deÞne a game Γε in which
player 2 is restricted to stationary strategies in Ts(ε
N). The pleasant feature
of this restriction is the following. For every pair (α, β) ∈ Σs × Ts(ε
N),
the induced play is absorbing. Therefore, the function γ(z, ·, ·) deÞned by
γ(z,α, β) = limn γn(z,α, β) is continuous over Σs × Ts(ε
N). The idea of
restricting strategy spaces in order to recover continuity of the (limit) payoﬀ
function is not new. It was, for instance, used in Vieille [7] to study absorbing
recursive games with properties F1 and F2, and in Flesch, Thuijsman and
Vrieze [3] to study general absorbing recursive games.
A natural idea is to look for a stationary equilibrium (αε, βε) in the game
Γε. The existence of such an equilibrium follows from standard arguments.
One then investigates the asymptotic properties of (αε, βε). Are of particular
interest the limit proÞle (α, β) = limε (α
ε, βε), and the limit payoﬀ γ =
limε γ(α
ε,βε) (both exist up to a subsequence). One might hope to be able
to construct an ε-equilibrium in the original game, by perturbing the limit
proÞle (α,β) in an appropriate way. This is the approach followed by Solan
[5]. It succeeds for games with at most two non-absorbing states. The
drawback is that the equilibrium payoﬀ one obtains diﬀers from γ. This
precludes any extension.
2.1 The modiÞed best-replies
We deÞne a product set-valued map Φ(α, β) = Φ1(β) × Φ
ε
2(α, β) on Σs ×
Ts(ε
N). Observe that for every (α, β) and every initial state z, the probability
of ending in the absorbing state z∗ is a rational function of the variables
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αz(a), βz(b), (z, a, b) ∈ S
∗ × A × B. Therefore, γ(z,α, β) is also a rational
function of the same variables.
2.1.1 DeÞnition of Φ1
DeÞne Φ1(β) as the set of stationary best-replies of player 1 to β:
Φ1(β) = {α
∗, such that γ1(z,α∗, β) ≥ γ1(z,α,β) for every z ∈ S∗,α ∈ Σs}
The existence of such a best-reply is due to Blackwell [1].
Set γ1M(z, β) = γ
1(z,α∗, β), where α∗ is any stationary best reply of
player 1. Since any proÞle in Σs × Ts(ε
N) is absorbing, an element of Φ1(β)
is characterized by the property:
E
£
γ1M(β)|z,αz, βz
¤
= max
A
E
£
γ1M(β)|z, ·, βz
¤
, for every z ∈ S∗. (1)
It follows that Φ1(β) is a face of the polytope of stationary strategies of player
1. It is clear that Φ1 is upper hemicontinuous, and has non-empty values.
2.1.2 DeÞnition of Φε2
We now deÞne Φε2(α,β). Any action of any strategy in Φ
ε
2(α, β) is to have
a positive probability. We shall deÞne a measure of the quality of a given
action, and require that actions of diﬀerent qualities have probabilities of
diﬀerent orders of magnitude. A natural candidate for measuring the quality
of an action b in state z is the quantity
E
£
γ2(α, β)|z,αz, b
¤
it measures the expected payoﬀ of player 2, when the initial state is z, and
he plays b then β against α. This deÞnes a good measure of how well actions
perform in state z against α. However, when it comes to comparing actions
across states z and z0, it is unsatisfactory since it gets intertwined with the
comparison of the two payoﬀs γ2(z,α, β) and γ2(z0,α, β).
To disentangle the two comparisons, we deÞne the cost of action b in state
z against α by
c(b; z,α, β) = max
B
E
£
γ2(α, β)|z,αz, ·
¤
− E
£
γ2(α, β)|z,αz, b
¤
.
The following properties clearly hold:
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P.1 c(b; z,α,β) ≥ 0 for every z, b,α,β; moreover, minB c(·; z,α, β) = 0;
P.2 For every b and z, the function c(b; z, ·, ·) is semialgebraic (see the chap-
ter by Neyman [4]).
Given (α, β), we denote by C0(α,β), ..., CL(α, β) the partition of S
∗ ×B
into level sets for the function c(·; ·,α, β), ranked by increasing cost (of course,
the number L + 1 of level sets depends on (α,β)). DeÞne p0 = 0, and
pl =
P l−1
0 |Ci(α,β)|, for 0 < l ≤ L. Thus, for (z0, b0) ∈ Cl(α,β), pl is the
number of state-action pairs (z, b) that are strictly better than (z0, b0), i.e.
c(b0; z0,α, β) > c(b; z,α;β).
DeÞne Φε2(α, β) as the set of
eβ ∈ Ts(εN ) such that for every (z, b) ∈
Cl(α,β), 0 ≤ l ≤ L, one has
εnpl + 1−1 ≤ eβz(b) ≤ ε
npl
By P.1, for every z ∈ S∗, there is b ∈ B, such that (z, b) ∈ C0(α, β). It
easily follows that Φε2(α, β) is non-empty. The exact deÞnition of Φ
ε
2(α,β) is
tailored for an application of Kakutanis theorem, and for getting semialge-
braicity properties. What is truly important for the asymptotic analysis that
we present later is the observation below, which follows immediately from the
deÞnition of Φε2(α, β): for every z, z
0 ∈ S∗ , b, b0 ∈ B, and eβ ∈ Φε2(α, β)
c(b0; z0,α,β) > c(b; z,α, β)⇒ eβz0(b
0) ≤ ε
h
eβz(b)
i |S∗|
(2)
2.1.3 Existence of a Þxed point
By Kakutanis theorem, the product map Φ1(α)×Φ
ε
2(α, β) has a Þxed point
in Σs × Ts(ε
N). Denote by
F (ε) = {(α, β) ∈ Σs × Ts(ε
N ),α ∈ Φ1(β), β ∈ Φ
ε
2(α,β)}
the set of these Þxed points. By P.2, and the deÞnitions of Φ1 and Φ
ε
2, the
set-valued map ε 7→ F (ε) is semialgebraic. Therefore, (see [4]) there exists
a semialgebraic selection of F : for each ε > 0 small enough, there exists
(αε,βε) ∈ F (ε), such that αεz(a), β
ε
z(b) have Puiseux expansions in ε, for
every (z, a, b) ∈ S∗ ×A×B.
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3 Asymptotic analysis
3.1 General comments
We here consider the Puiseux proÞle (αε,βε) that was obtained in the previ-
ous section. Our chief goal is to prove that γ = limε γ(α
ε,βε) is an equilibrium
payoﬀ of the game. We set (α0,β0) = limε(α
ε, βε).
Recall from [6] that the map ε 7→ (αε, βε) induces a hierarchical decom-
position of S∗ into (a forest of) communicating sets, which reßects how the
behavior of the Markov chain induced by (αε,βε) depends on ε.
A communicating set C is deÞned by the property that, given an initial
state in C, the probability under (αε, βε) that the play will reach any state
in C before it leaves C goes to one as ε goes to zero. The leaves of the forest
(i.e., the smallest communicating sets) coincide with the subsets of S∗, which
are ergodic w.r.t. (α0,β0). The roots are the largest communicating sets.
We denote by D1, ..., DH the roots of the forest. We set T = S∗\(D1... ∪
DH): T is the set of states which belong to no communicating set.
For 1 ≤ h ≤ H, we denote by Qh the distribution of exit from Dh, as
deÞned by (αε, βε)ε: Q
h(z) is the limit (as ε goes to zero) of the probability
under (αε, βε) that, starting from Dh, z is the Þrst state outside Dh that is
reached.
Consider the Markov chain over the state space {{D1}, ..., {DH}}∪T ∪A
whose transition function ep is Qh in {Dh}, and p(·|z,α0, β0) for z ∈ T .
Lemma 2 The Markov chain with transition function ep is absorbing.
Proof. there would otherwise be a communicating set included in T , or
a communicating set which strictly contains some Dh. In either case, this
would contradict the fact that D1, ..., DH are the roots of the forest.
The next proposition presents no diﬃculty. It uses the previous lemma.
Proposition 3 Assume that: (1) for each z ∈ T , the pair of mixed actions
(α0z, β
0
z ) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrix game with payoﬀ E [γ|z, ·, ·] ;(2)
for each 1 ≤ h ≤ H, the distribution Qh is a controllable exit distribution for
γ. Then γ is an equilibrium payoﬀ.
6
Proof. let us brießy describe a proÞle (σ, τ ) which supports γ. Whenever
the current state belongs to T , the proÞle (σ, τ ) plays like (α0, β0) (irrespec-
tive of past play). Whenever the game enters some set Dh, the players switch
to the proÞle (σh, τh) associated with the controllable exit distribution Qh.
Finally, the players switch to punishment strategies if the game has not en-
tered an absorbing state by stage N0, where N0 is large enough.
Thus, it suﬃces to prove that both items of this proposition are satisÞed.
It is straightforward to check the Þrst, much more diﬃcult to check the
second.
Lemma 4 For each z ∈ S∗, the pair of mixed actions (α0z,β
0
z ) is a Nash
equilibrium of the matrix game with payoﬀ E(γ|z, ·, ·)
Proof. we Þrst prove that α0z is a best reply to β
0
z . For each ε, α
ε
z
maximizes E [γ1(αε, βε)|z, ·, βεz ]. By letting ε go to zero, one gets that α
0
z
maximizes E [γ1|z, ·, β0z ].
Observe that ε 7→ c(b; z,αε, βε) is semi-algebraic, for every b, z, hence has
a constant sign in a neighborhood of zero. Let b ∈ B. If it is the case that
c(b; z,αε, βε) > 0, for ε small enough, one has βεz(b) ≤ ε, by deÞnition of Φ
ε
2.
Therefore, for every action b in the support of β0zand ε small enough, one has
c(b; z,αε, βε) = 0 which means that b maximizes E [γ2(αε, βε)|z,αε, ·]. One
concludes as for player 1.
In the sequel, we give the main ideas of the proof that, for every h, the
distribution Qh of exit from Dh is controllable (for the continuation payoﬀ
γ). We let h be given and write D and Q for Dh and Qh.
W.l.o.g, one may assume that, for every (z, a, b) ∈ D ×A×B,
p(D|z, a, b) < 1⇒ p(D|z, a, b) = 0.
For the sake of the presentation, it is also convenient to assume that for any
two distinct triples (z1, a1, b1), (z2, a2, b2) ∈ D×A×B such that p(D|z1, a1, b1) =
p(D|z2, a2, b2) = 0, the supports of the two distributions p(·|z1, a1, b1) and
p(·|z2, a2, b2) are disjoint.
>From [6], we know that Q can be decomposed as a convex combination
of unilateral exits and joint exits:
Q =
X
l∈L1
µlQl +
X
l∈L2
µlQl +
X
l∈L3
µlQl
where Ql = p(·|zl, al, β
0
zl
) (for some (zl, al) ∈ D × A) for l ∈ L1, Ql =
p(·|zl,α
0
zl
, bl) for l ∈ L2, and Ql = p(·|zl, al, bl) for l ∈ L3. For l ∈ L3, al and
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bl have the property p(D|zl,α
0
zl
, bl) = 1 = p(D|zl, al, β
0
zl
). We assume µl > 0,
for every l. Given our assumption on the supports, this decomposition is
unique. To interpret (µl), denote by e the exit stage from D. For l ∈ L1,
µl is the limit as ε goes to zero of the probability that (z
e−1, ae−1) = (zl,al).
Similar interpretations are true for l ∈ L2, L3.
We refer to elements of L1, L2, L3 as unilateral exits of player 1, unilateral
exits of player 2, and joint exits.
To conclude this section, we explain what is the basic issue in proving that
Q is controllable. As is shown in [6], this is straightforward if Qlγ
1 = γ1(D)
for every l ∈ L1, and Qlγ
2 = γ2(D) for every l ∈ L2. Obtaining the Þrst
property is not diﬃcult. However, there is no reason why the second property
should hold. It might even be the case that Qlγ
2 does depend on l ∈ L2. In
such a case, it is clear that player 2 would favor the unilateral exits l ∈ L2 for
which Qlγ
2 is highest. It is also clear that no statistical test can be designed
that would force player 2 to choose his various unilateral exits according to
the weights µl, l ∈ L2.
In the next section, we show on an example how the deÞnition of the
modiÞed best-replies allows us to recover some properties of the quantities
Qlγ
1, for l ∈ L2 (expected exit payoﬀs of player 1, associated to unilateral
exits of player 2). We later sketch how to deal with the general case.
3.2 An example
Let us consider a game with two non-absorbing states, labeled z1 and z2.
We shall not deÞne the game completely. We rather assume that the basic
data of the game (payoﬀs and transitions) are such that the Puiseux proÞle
(αε,βε) has the following properties:
1. the unique maximal communicating set is D = S∗ = {z1, z2}. In par-
ticular, the limit payoﬀ γ(z) = lim γ(z,αε, βε) is independent of the
initial state z; we denote it γ(D);
2. there exist m,m0 ∈ L2, such that Qmγ
2 < Qm0γ
2 < γ2(D).
Our goal is to deduce from the Þxed-point properties of (αε, βε) a number
of additional properties.
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3.2.1 General remarks
We Þrst derive elementary consequences of Lemma 4:
 for each l ∈ L1, Qlγ
1 = γ1(D);
 for each l ∈ L2, Qlγ
2 ≤ γ2(D);
 Observe that γ2(z1) = maxB E
£
γ2|z1,α0z1 , ·
¤
, and that a similar relation
holds for γ2(z2).Since γ2(z1) = γ2(z2), comparing the (limit) costs of
two actions b and b0 in the two states z and z0 is equivalent to comparing
E [γ2|z,α0z, b] and E [γ
2|z0,α0z0 , b
0] :
lim
ε
c(b; z,αε, βε) > lim
ε
c(b0; z0,αε, βε)⇔ E
£
γ2|z,α0z, b
¤
< E
£
γ2|z0,α0z0, b
0
¤
(3)
We now use the fact that (αε,βε) is a Puiseux proÞle. Thus, there are
positive real numbers pz(b), and nonnegative numbers dz(b) ((z, b) ∈ S
∗×B),
such βεz(b) ∼ pz(b)ε
dz (b) as ε goes to zero. Similarly, αεz(a) ∼ pz(a)εdz (a) . By
deÞnition of Φ1, pz(a) > 0 only if a maximizes E [γ
1(αε, βε)|z, ·, βεz ] .
We conclude this section with a crucial observation. From (3) and the
deÞnition of Φε2, one deduces that, for any two pairs (z, b) and (z
0, b0),
E
£
γ2|z,α0z, b
¤
< E
£
γ2|z0,α0z0, b
0
¤
⇒ dz(b) > 2dz0(b
0). (4)
3.2.2 D-graphs and degrees of transitions
Recall that D is a communicating set. From Freidlin-Wentzells formula,
we know that the exit distribution Q from D can be expressed in terms of
D-graphs. We shall here have a closer look.
Since D is a communicating set, there is some pair (a, b) such that
p(D|z1, a, b) = 1 and p(z2|z1, a, b) > 0. DeÞne the degree of the transi-
tion from z1 to z2, d(z1 → z2) as the minimum of dz1(a) + dz1(b) over such
pairs (a, b). DeÞne d(z2 → z1) similarly.
For l ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3, we deÞne the degree deg(l) of the exit labeled l as
follows. If l ∈ L3 with Ql = p(·|z
2, al, bl), we set
deg(l) = d(z1 → z2) + dz2(al) + dz2(bl).
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If l ∈ L1 with Ql = p(·|z
2, al,βz2), we set
deg(l) = d(z1 → z2) + dz2(al).
The degree of other types of exits is deÞned accordingly. The following ob-
servation is an immediate consequence of Freidlin-Wentzells formula.
Lemma 5 deg(l) is independent of l ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3.
3.2.3 Exits of player 2 and continuation payoﬀs of player 1
We derive some implications of Lemma 5 and (4). Since Qmγ
2 < Qm0γ
2,
dzm (bm) > dzm 0 (bm0). (5)
Since deg(m) = deg(m0), it must be the case that zm 6= zm0 . To Þx the ideas,
we assume zm = z
1, and zm0 = z
2. For similar reasons, if p(S∗|z1,α0z1 , b) < 1,
then one has E
£
γ2|z1,α0z1 , b
¤
≤ 1. Another consequence is that, for any
l ∈ L2, Qlγ
2 = Qmγ
2 if zl = z
1, and Qlγ
2 = Qm0γ
Z if zl = z
2. We divide the
unilateral exits L2 of player 2 into L
1
2 and L
2
2 accordingly.
Denote by Q1 and Q2 the renormalizations of Q over exits in L
1
2 and L
2
2
respectively:
Qi =
P
l∈Li2
µlQlP
l∈Li2
µl
, .i = 1, 2.
We shall prove that Q1γ
1 = γ1(D) = Q2γ
1. In words, this means that player
1 is indiﬀerent between the two classes of unilateral exits of player 2.
Lemma 6 Q1γ
1 = γ1(D).
Proof. We show that player 1 is able to block the transition from z1 to z2.
By this, we mean that, in order to reach z2 from z1without leaving {z1, z2}, it
is necessary that player 1 perturbs α0z1 . We argue by contradiction. Assume
that, for some b, p(S∗|z1,α0z1 , b) = 1 and p(z
2|z1,α0z1 , b) > 0. Observe that
E
£
γ2|z1,α0z1 , b
¤
= γ2(D). Therefore,
dz1(bm) > 2dz2(bm0) and dz1(bm) > 2dz1(b).
Since d(z1 → z2) ≤ dz1(b), and d(z
2 → z1) ≥ 0, this yields
d(z2 → z1) + dz1(bm) > d(z
1
→ z2) + dz2(bm0)
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which contradicts deg(m) = deg(m0).
By deÞnition of Φ1, α
0 is a best reply to βε, for every ε small enough. In
particular,
lim
ε
γ1(z1,α0,βε) = lim
ε
γ1(z1,αε,βε) = 1.
Starting from z1, the play cannot reach z2 under (α0, βε) (in particular, {z1}
is an ergodic set under (α0, β0)). It will eventually reach an absorbing state,
when player 2 plays a unilateral exit. It is easy to check that
lim
ε
γ1(z1,α0, βε) = Q1γ
1.
Lemma 7 Q2γ
1 = γ1(D)
Proof. the proof is more subtle than the previous one. The previous
argument relies on the fact that, when player 1 plays α0, there is no way for
player 2 to reach z2, starting from z1. When one exchanges z1 and z2, the
corresponding fact needs not hold. It might for instance be the case that z2
is transient under (α0, β0). It might thus be the case that
lim
ε
γ1(z2,α0, βε) = Q1γ
1
therefore repeating the previous argument starting from z2 gives nothing
new.
However, the previous argument works in the case where player 1 can
block the transition from z2 to z1: there is no b ∈ B, such that p({z1, z2}|z2,α0z2 , b) =
1 and p(z1|z2,α0z2 , b) > 0. Thus we may assume that such a b does exist.
Denote it b∗.
We shall infer additional properties by modifying the degrees of the ac-
tions of player 1. Assume that, for every pair such that dz(a) > 0 the degree
of a is modiÞed to dz(a) (we do not rule out the case dz(a) = dz(a)), and
denote by αε the resulting strategy. Formally,
αεz(a) =
pz(a)ε
dz (a)
P
A pz(a
0)εdz (a0)
where we set for simplicity dz(a) = 0 if dz(a) = 0. Clearly, α
ε belongs to
Φ1(β
ε) and thus
lim
ε
γ1(αε,βε) = γ1.
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It is also clear that limε γ
1(αε, βε) =
P
l∈L1
µlQl +
P
l∈L2
µlQl +
P
l∈L3
µlQl
for some weights (µl)l (some of these weights might here be zero).
2
We now show that, by a proper choice of the degrees dz(a), for (z, a) ∈
S∗ ×A, the induced weights µl will satisfy
C.1 µl = 0, for each l ∈ L1 ∪ L3
C.2 µl =
µlP
L 2
µk
, for l ∈ L2.
For l ∈ L1 ∪ L3, we Þx dzl (al) > dzl (al): we increase the degree of all
the actions of player 1 which are involved in unilateral exits of player 1 or in
joint exits. Clearly, the new degree deg(l) of any l ∈ L1 ∪ L3 is higher than
deg(l).
We shall now prove that deg(l) = deg(l), for any l ∈ L2. This will provide
C.1. Since degrees of actions of player 2 are unchanged, we need to prove
that
deg(z1 → z2) = deg(z1 → z2)
deg(z2 → z1) = deg(z2 → z1)
To get C.2, one needs more. Let (a, b) ∈ A×B be any pair of actions which
is involved in the transition z1 → z2 :
p({z1, z2}|z1, a, b) = 1, p(z2|z1, a, b) > 0 and dz1(a) + dz1(b) = d(z
1
→ z2).
We shall prove that dz1(a) = dz1(a). Results regarding transitions from z
2
to z1 can be obtained by a similar proof.
Assume that dz1(a) > dz1(a). By deÞnition of the new degrees, this means
that a = al , for some l ∈ L1 ∪ L3. Clearly, l ∈ L1 would contradict the fact
that p({z1, z2}|z1, a, β0z1) = 1. Thus, l ∈ L3 : one has Ql = p(·|z
1, a, bl), for
some bl ∈ B such that p({z
1, z2}|z1,α0z1 , bl) = 1.
By Lemma 5, one has deg(m0) = deg(l), which reads
deg(z1 → z2) + dz2(bm0) = deg(z
2
→ z1) + dz1(a) + dz1(bl). (6)
Recall now that d(z1 → z2) = dz1(a) + dz1(b) and that, by deÞnition of b
∗,
one has d(z2 → z1) ≤ dz2(b
∗). Substituting in (6) yields
dz2(bm0) ≤ dz1(bl) + dz2(b
∗)− dz1(b) ≤ dz1(bl) + dz2(b
∗). (7)
Observe now that neither bl in state z
1, nor b∗ in state z2 is a unilateral
exit of player 2: one has p(γ2|z1,α0z1 , bl) = γ
2(D) = p(γ2|z2,α0z2 , b
∗). By (4),
this implies
dz2(bm0) > 2dz1(bl) and dz2(bm0) > 2dz2(b
∗),
2It is not clear that the decomposition of the new exit distribution will involve only the
exits labeled l ∈ L . This will however be the case, provided the degrees are only slightly
modiÞed.
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which is in contradiction with (7). It is now not diﬃcult to get the result.
What have we proven so far ? Let us rephrase our results:
 denote by L2 the set of l ∈ L2 which satisfy Qlγ
2 < γ2(D); there is a
partition (L12, L
2
2) of L2 into level sets for Qlγ
2;
 to each set Li2 (i = 1, 2) is associated a communicating subset F
iof D :
F 1 = {z1}, and F 2 = {z2} or {z1, z2} depending on whether or not
player 1 can block the transition from z2 to z1. For each i, player 1 can
block the transition from F i to the remaining part of D (if F i = D,
this is an empty statement). Moreover,
 the expectation of γ1 under the renormalized exit distributions
QL12 and QL22 is γ
1(D).
 in F i, there is no unilateral exit of player 2 which is better than
exits in Li2 :
E
£
γ2|zl,α
0
zl
, bl
¤
≥ E
£
γ2|z,α0z, b
¤
,
for every l ∈ Li2, (z, b) ∈ F
i ×B such that p({z1, z2}|z,α0z, b) < 1.
 Þnally, Qlγ
1 = γ1(D) for every l ∈ L1, E [γ
1|z, a, β0z ] ≤ γ
1(D) and
E [γ2|z,α0z, b] ≤ γ
2(D), for every (z, a, b) ∈ D × A×B.
As shown in [6], this is enough to ensure that Q is controllable. The
corresponding proÞle uses public lotteries, performed by player 1.
3.3 The general case
We brießy indicate how to generalize the previous example. We make no
attempt at a proof.
As above, let D be a maximal communicating subset, and write the de-
composition of the corresponding exit distribution as
Q =
X
l∈L1
µlQl +
X
l∈L2
µlQl +
X
l∈L3
µlQl
The problem is to Þnd a partition (L1, ..., LH) of L2 = {l ∈ L2, Qlγ
2 < γ2(D)}
and communicating subsets (F 1, ..., FH) of D that have the properties of the
previous section.
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Let l ∈ L2. Denote by D
1 ⊂ D2... ⊂ DM the communicating subsets of D
which contain zl. Denote by D(l) the Þrst one in this sequence that has the
property that it is much more diﬃcult to leave D(l) than to reach zl starting
fromD(l). We will not deÞne this property formally. It is an extension of the
property that we used in the case of two non-absorbing states for F i, namely
that player 1 can block the transition from F i to the remaining states of D.
The sets L1, ..., LH and F 1, ..., FH are obtained as follows. Denote Þrst
by L
1
, ..., L
P
the partition of L2 into level sets for l 7→ Qlγ
2. For each p, we
look at the equivalence classes of the relation Rp deÞned on L
p
by
lRpl
0
⇔ D(l) = D(l0)
The sets L1, ..., LH are all the equivalence classes of all the relations Rp,
1 ≤ p ≤ P . For 1 ≤ h ≤ H, we set Dh = D(l), where l ∈ Lh.
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